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PHISHING & VAT FRAUD IN CO2 PERMITS:
DICE IN THE EU-ETS NOW; DICE IN POWER TOMORROW
Richard Thompson Ainsworth
In accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of October 13, 2003, trade in
greenhouse gas emissions commenced in the European Union (EU) on January 1, 2005.
The EU-Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) was born.1
The EU has a Value Added Tax (VAT). VAT is a transaction-based levy on all
trade in goods and services.2 Each Member State has a VAT as a condition of
membership.3 Until January 3, 2017 transactions in CO2 permits are taxed as services.4
After this date they are exempt as financial instruments.5
This change in VAT treatment of CO2 permits is directly attributable to rampant
fraud in the market. Fraud has been so severe in CO2 permits that public trust in the

1

DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
96/61/EC, O.J. (L 275) 32, Art. 4.
2
Under EU case law a VAT is a tax comprised of four elements. It is: (1) applied to goods and services;
(2) proportional to the price charged; (3) applied at each stage of the production and distribution process;
and (4) implemented by deducting the VAT on inputs from VAT collected on outputs, and thereby only
collecting tax on the value added at each stage. Banca popolare di Cremona C-475/03.
CO2 permits are deemed to be services. They are subject to the VAT in all Member States.
VALUE ADDED TAX COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPER 443 REV 1, Question Concerning the Application of
Community VAT Provisions: Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances, TAXUD/1625/04 REV 1 (May 27
2004).
3
Article 99 of the (original) European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty states:
The Commission shall consider how the legislation of the various Member States
concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation, including
countervailing measures applicable to trade between Member States, can be harmonized
in the interest of the common market
The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council, which shall act unanimously
without prejudice to the provisions of Article 100 and 101.
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 99 was renumbered Article 93 EC, which is now Article 113 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which reads:
The Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure
and consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, adopt
provisions for the harmonization of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties
and other forms of taxation to the extent that such harmonization is necessary to ensure
the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of
competition.
4
DIRECTIVE 2014/65/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 May 2014 on markets
in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173,
12.6.2014, p. 84) at Annex I, Section C(11) defines a financial instrument to include:
Emission allowances consisting of any units recognized for compliance with the requirements
of Directive 2003/87/EC (Emissions Trading Scheme).
5
Romania is a notable exception. CO2 permits have always been treated as financial instruments, but only
in this Member State.
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EU’s emissions trading scheme has been undermined.6 The Preamble to Directive
2014/65/EU confirms as much at paragraph (11). Faced with a clear policy choice
between fighting VAT fraud and the EU’s commitment to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions through cap and trade, the EU has chosen the environment.7 The Preamble
states:
A range of fraudulent practices have occurred in spot secondary markets
in emission allowances (EUA) which could undermine trust in the
emissions trading scheme … establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community and … measures are
being taken to strengthen the system of EUA registries and conditions for
opening an account to trade EUAs. [Thus] In order to reinforce the
integrity and safeguard the efficient functioning of those markets,
including comprehensive supervision of trading activity, it is appropriate
to complement measures taken … on market abuse … and … by
classifying them as financial instruments.
This is not the end of the story of EUAs and the EU VAT. Important lessons have
been learned about controlling fraud from efforts made in the emissions markets.
Unfortunately, time and political patience have run out.
During the period when CO2 permits have been (and still are) subject to VAT,
there is an instructive, and very natural overlap of the EU-ETS and the VAT system. It is
apparent to the careful observer that within this limited market segment fraud can be
prevented if the EU-ETS real-time database is utilized to its fullest. Lessons are being
learned, and these lessons can be applied elsewhere in the EU market. The most
immediate market application is in the energy commodity sector.8

6

Europol, Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2013 (Public Version) March 2013 at
27 indicates that MITC in all goods and services is estimated at 100 billion euro per year:
MTIC fraud is a widespread criminal offence affecting many, if not all EU MS. The
perpetrators of MTIC fraud are present both inside and outside the EU. Activities related
to MTIC fraud can be directed remotely using the internet. MTIC deprives states of tax
revenue required to make investments, maintain public sector services and service foreign
debt. The EU is loosing an estimated 100 billion Euros of MTIC income.
7
Detailed consideration of fraud in the CO2 market is provided by Marius-Christian Frunza, FRAUD AND
CARBON MARKETS (Routledge, 2013). An assessment of lessons learned in the design of a cap and trade
system is provided by Stefan E. Weishaar, EMISSIONS TRADING DESIGN: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW (New
Horizons in Environmental and Energy Law, 2014).
8
See: PowerNext, EU anti-VAT-fraud package: Call for a comprehensive implementation by all Member
States --Ten European gas & electricity associations call for a comprehensive implementation of the EU
anti-VAT-fraud package by all 28 Member States (November 28, 2014). The ten gas and electric
exchanges involved in PowerNext are AIB, CEER, EACH, EFET, ENTSO-E, EURELECTRIC, Eurogas,
Europex, GIE, and LEBA.
Following the large-scale VAT fraud discovered in the CO2 emissions market in 2009,
criminal networks are now targeting other tradable goods such as gas and electricity. In
order to prevent further major fraud with several billion euros in VAT losses in the
energy commodity sector, the ten largest European energy associations have been
coordinating their efforts in the fight against VAT fraud since 2010. The group aims at
increasing the awareness among all relevant stakeholders of this high-level risk along the
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This paper considers a particular phishing attack in the CO2 market – the January
18, 2011 attack on the Czech registry. This phishing fraud is used only as an example.
Others are available to the same effect. The focus of this paper is not on this very
sensational fraud; it is on the ETS/ VAT overlap, and the ability to apply what has been
learned here to the trade in gas and electricity.
More specifically, careful consideration of this overlap demonstrates why the
Digital Invoice Customs Exchange (DICE) proposal works, and why it is an effective
fraud prevention mechanism in Rwanda.9 DICE is set for adoption in the remaining
states of the East African Community (EAC). When fully adopted, the EAC will become
a template for fraud prevention in the EU.10
EU-ETS
The synergy between the EU-ETS and the EU VAT is natural. Fraudsters saw it
immediately. Tax enforcement has been slow to catch on, but may have stumbled on a
useful tax enforcement tool in its transactional database. A successful phishing attack not
only provides fraudsters with a gain from the outright sale of stolen CO2 permits, it also
supplies the “assets” that can cycle through EU-wide MTIC fraud carousels.11 The
transactional database built by the EU-ETS to follow CO2 permits throughout the EU is
sufficiently robust to also follow the fraud in real-time.
The EU-ETS is the first international trading system for CO2 emissions in the
world. It applies to the 28 EU Member States as well as Norway, Iceland and
Liechtenstein (the European Economic Area – EEA), and covers close to half of the EU’s
CO2 emissions.12 One permit gives the holder the right to emit one ton of CO2 (or the
equivalent amount of another greenhouse gas). This is a cap and trade system.
energy value chain and calls for legislative measures to end VAT fraud in gas, electricity
and emissions trading in Europe.
Available at:
http://www.powernext.com/#sk;tp=app;n=article;f=getArticle;t=article_view;fp=register:1,m:News_Room,
split::,system_name:eu_anti-vatfraud_package_ten_european_gas_electricity_associations_call_for_a_comprehensive_implementation_by
_all_28_member_states;lang=en_US
9
See: Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Rwanda – Cutting-Edge VAT Compliance, 46 CCH
GLOBAL TAX WEEKLY 1 (September 26, 2013).
10
Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Plugging the Leaks in the East African Community’s VATs, 72
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 561 (November 11, 2013).
11
It is not a coincidence that phishing frauds were on the rise in the EU at precisely the same time that
MTIC frauds in the CO2 markets forced the collapse of the BlueNext exchange, and the realignment of the
VAT rates on CO2 permits in France, the Netherlands and the UK.
12
Effective from 2012, the EU ETS was amended to bring in the aviation sector. Directive 2008/101/EC
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community (OJ L 8/3 (January 13, 2009). This legislation applies to
EU and non-EU airlines. However, to allow time for negotiations on a global market-basis measure
applying to all aviation emissions, the EU ETS was suspended for all flights to and from non-EU countries.
Decision 377/2013/EU derogating temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community (April 24, 2013) OJ L 113/1. For the
2013-16 period the legislation has been further amended so that only flight within the EEA are impacted.

3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2537545

Richard T. Ainsworth
Phishing, DICE & Power Exchanges
12/12/14

The heart of the EU-ETS is its system of on-line registries in each Member State
and the Community Independent Transaction Log. The registries were designed to
provide accurate accounting of all permits issued under the system, and were to keep
track of ownership much the same way banks track money. To participate in the system
a company (or a physical person) opens an account in one of the registries (application is
online at registry websites). The registries themselves are online databases that record:
• the national plan indicating the permits assigned;
• accounts (held by a company or a physical person) to which those permits have
been allocated;
• transfers of permits ("transactions") performed by the account holders;
• annual verified CO2 emissions from installations;
• annual reconciliation of permits and verified emissions, where each company
must have surrendered enough permits to cover all its emissions.
The Community Independent Transaction Log records and authorizes all
transactions between accounts in the EU-ETS.13 Verification is done automatically. It
endeavors to ensure that any transfer of permits from one account to another is consistent
with ETS rules. As of January 1, 2012, Article 19(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC mandated
a single Union Registry that is in operation today.14
Importantly, on August 20, 2012 the European Commission activated the public
site for the European Union Transaction Log.15 This followed full activation of the
Union Registry in June 2012. What this means is that for the first time the public was
able to trace the sale of CO2 permits through the registries in real-time.
This paper will use the European Transaction Log to follow a block of stolen CO2
permits as they transit through the EU-ETS from company-to-company, and from
country-to-country. We will not only be able to identify who was in technical
“possession” of the stolen certificates at any point in time, we will also be able to identify

The EU made this change following an agreement by the International Civil Aviation Organization
Assembly in October 2013 to develop the global market-based mechanism.
13
In the field of databases in computer science, a transaction log (also transaction journal, database log,
binary log or audit trail) is a history of actions executed by a database management system to guarantee
ACID properties over crashes or hardware failures. Physically, a log is a file of updates done to the
database, stored in stable storage. ACID is an acronym for Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, and
Durability. It is a set of properties that guarantee that database transactions are processed reliably.
If, after a start, the database is found in an inconsistent state or not been shut down properly, the database
management system reviews the database logs for uncommitted transactions and rolls back the changes
made by these transactions. Additionally, all transactions that are already committed but whose changes
were not yet materialized in the database are re-applied. Both are done to ensure atomicity and durability of
transactions. This term is not to be confused with other, human-readable logs that a database management
system usually provides.
14
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 389/2013 (May 2, 2013) set down the specific rules for the registry.
This regulation applied to allowance created for the trading period commencing on January 1, 2013 and
subsequent periods (annual emission allocation units and Kyoto units). It also applied to aviation units.
15
See: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/
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places along the chain where the stolen CO2 permits could have been used in a missing
trader (MTIC) fraud.
PHISHING IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC’S REGISTRY
Before lunch on Tuesday, January 18, 2011, a bomb threat was called into the
Prague offices of OTE, the company that manages the Czech Republic’s emissions
registry. The hoax forced the building to be evacuated, and covered the completion of a
phishing operation that stole 500,000 European Union Allowances (EUAs).16 Valued at
€14 each at the time of the attack, this theft was worth €7 million.17
The theft was discovered at 7:00 am the next morning when one of OTE’s clients
called and reported that thousands of EUAs had gone missing. Press reports at the time
indicted that the EUAs “… had bounced from the Czech Republic to Poland, Estonia and
Liechtenstein before disappearing.”18
In the post August 20, 2012 world, the public can now follow these stolen EUAs
much more precisely in the European Union Transaction Log. We know now that the
EUAs did not “disappear.” They ended up in the UK with Shell Trading International
Ltd. (STIL), which apparently used the credits. The entire transaction from the Czech
registry through to STIL took less than one-and-a-half hours (beginning at 9:32 am in the
Czech republic and ending at 10:59 in the UK). The entire transaction chain took place
while the Czech registry was closed. The figure below sets out the transaction chain after
the phishing attack.

16

EUA is the official title of the carbon credit, or pollution permit that is traded in the EU-ETS. Each EUA
represents one ton of CO2 that the holder is allowed to emit.
17
Two other thefts occurred at the same time making the total lost 1.175 million EUAs. 500,000 was taken
from CEZ, a state-owned Czech utility, another 200,000 was taken from a separate CEZ account, and
475,000 was removed from the Blackstone Global Ventures accounts, another Czech firm with EUAs held
at the Czech registry. See: Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, United Kingdom: Four
Men Jailed for Carbon Credit Cyber-Heist, (September 25, 2014).
18
Rowena Mason, The Great Carbon Trading Scandal, Telegraph (January 30, 2011) at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/8290533/The-great-carbon-trading-scandal.html.
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But we know more. We also know who called in the bomb scare, and who
removed the EUAs from the Czech registry. It was a criminal gang of four from the UK.
They were found guilty of the theft, and were sentenced on September 28, 2014:
• Ruman Patel (31), arrested June 2012, pled guilty, sentenced to 32 months;
• Hanif Patel (53), arrested April 2014, three week trial leading to a conviction,
sentenced to 7 years;
• Ayyub Ibrahim (60), arrested June 2012, pled guilty, sentenced to 42 months;
• Mohammed Hanif Patel (53), arrested 2012, pled guilty, sentenced to 42 months.
The Czech theft was the tipping point for the EU Commission. There were a
series of responses, some were EU-ETS focused, others were VAT focused. The
immediate short-term response was to suspend trading across all 30 national registries the
next day (January 19, 2011). The Czech exchange remained closed until mid-March.
In the medium-term the response was to significantly increase security in the EUETS. This involved out-of band confirmation of transactions,19 the introduction of
trusted account lists and new account categories, the 4-eye principle,20 and strengthened
19
20

Buyers and sellers must confirm transactions over two separate networks such as e-mail and telephone.
The 4-eye principle refers to a security mechanism whereby
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know-your-customer checks. The competent authorities were given the ability to act
quickly in cases of fraud by delaying the completion of some transactions, by freezing
allowances and accounts in cases of suspicious transactions, and giving wider access to
law enforcement authorities to confidential information. Serial numbers of specific
certificates will be visible in the databases, but only to law enforcement authorities.21
A long-term VAT solution is also in place. As of January 3, 2017 emissions
certificates will be treated as non-taxable financial instruments.22 There can be no MTIC
if there is no VAT.
FOLLOWING THE CZECH PERMITS
If we go to the European Transaction Log we can follow the stolen Czech
permits. The trail goes as follows. On January 18, 2011 500,000 EUAs are transferred
from the Czech registry to a Polish company (1124 Segel Sp. ZOO Holding). The time
of the transfer is precisely 09.32:06.115.23 About forty-five minutes later these EUAs are
transferred in a block to another Polish company (Huntingdon Sp. ZOO).24
Huntingdon Sp. ZOO was established by Hanif Patel and Mohammed Patel, and
1124 Segel Sp. ZOO was established by Ruman Patel.25 An interesting element of this
21

The EU-ETS developed largely through three regulations. 2216/2004 of 21 December 200o
DIRECTIVE 2014/65/EU, supra note 4.
23
Please see:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/transaction.do?languageCode=en&startDate=01%2F06%2F2009&end
Date=01%2F05%2F2012&transactionStatus=4&fromCompletionDate=&toCompletionDate=&transactionI
D=&transactionType=-1&suppTransactionType=-1&originatingRegistry=-1&destinationRegistry=1&originatingAccountType=-1&destinationAccountType=1&originatingAccountNumber=&destinationAccountNumber=1124&originatingAccountIdentifier=&desti
nationAccountIdentifier=&originatingAccountHolder=&destinationAccountHolder=&search=Search&curr
entSortSettings
24
Please see:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/transaction.do?languageCode=en&startDate=01%2F06%2F2009&end
Date=01%2F05%2F2012&transactionStatus=4&fromCompletionDate=&toCompletionDate=&transactionI
D=&transactionType=-1&suppTransactionType=-1&originatingRegistry=-1&destinationRegistry=1&originatingAccountType=121&destinationAccountType=121&originatingAccountNumber=&destinatio
nAccountNumber=&originatingAccountIdentifier=&destinationAccountIdentifier=&originatingAccountHo
lder=Segel+SP+ZOO&destinationAccountHolder=&search=Search&currentSortSettings
25
Ruman Patel received the shortest sentence among the four fraudsters. This may have been attributable
to the court believing that he was more of a puppet than a puppet master.
Defending Ruman Patel, Russell Davies said he [Rudman Patel] was a “dupe”,
not an innocent dupe, but a dupe nevertheless. He explained Patel was approached in
2010, when he owed a £30,000 debt as a result of a failed business venture.
He had received serious threats of violence. His financial position – together
with the threats he received – made him vulnerable. The court heard although he played
an important role in a substantial international fraud, it was obvious that he could not
have known what he was lending his assistance to.
Patel registered his company in his own name, providing accurate details of his
identity that were verified by a local solicitor. Mr. Davies said: “It was inevitable that as
soon as the fraud was detected, he would be identified and prosecuted for fraud.”
Preston Men Admit to Playing Part in £6m global credit scam, LANCASTER EVENING POST (September 13,
2014) available at: http://www.lep.co.uk/news/local/preston-men-admit-to-playing-part-in-6m-globalcredit-scam-1-6838730
22
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transaction chain is that even though the EUAs are sold between two Polish companies
Polish VAT is not applicable. Huntingdon Sp. ZOO acquired the EUAs through their
Liechtenstein, not their Polish account. This is a transaction between a Member State and
a Third Country.
If VAT were applicable, then we could well have had a missing trader opportunity
where the first Polish company (Huntingdon Sp. ZOO) would collect VAT from the
second (1124 Segel Sp. ZOO), and then would go missing. However, Huntingdon Sp.
ZOO has registry accounts in both Poland and Liechtenstein, and for this transaction it
used its Liechtenstein account. No Polish VAT was collected.
Huntingdon Sp. ZOO then transfers the entire block of 500,000 EUAs to SVS
Securities, a UK firm using its UK account.26 From there the EUAs are transferred to
Shell Trading International Ltd.27 The time is now 10.59:28.984 on the morning of
January 18, 2011. This theft will not be identified until some time after 9:00 am on
January 19, 2011.
At trial it was confirmed that none of the money was recovered. The payment by
STIL was made in euros, converted to dollars, and then passed through legitimate firms
around the world including China, India, Hong Kong and Dubai.28
DICE - DIGITAL INVOICE CUSTOMS EXCHANGE
A digital invoice customs exchange (DICE) is a technology-intensive tax
compliance regimen for VAT that utilizes invoice encryption to safeguard transactional
data exchanged between seller and buyer in both domestic and import/export contexts
while simultaneously notifying concerned jurisdictions of the transaction details.
The data needed for DICE is currently available in real time in the European
Transaction Log of the EU-ETS. All that would be needed to roll out a comprehensive
solution to MTIC fraud in the energy commodity sector would be to replicate the EUETS in the energy sector, and to adopt the digital invoice and customs exchange elements
of DICE.
26

Please see:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/transaction.do?languageCode=en&startDate=01%2F06%2F2009&end
Date=01%2F05%2F2012&transactionStatus=4&fromCompletionDate=&toCompletionDate=&transactionI
D=&transactionType=-1&suppTransactionType=-1&originatingRegistry=-1&destinationRegistry=1&originatingAccountType=121&destinationAccountType=121&originatingAccountNumber=83&destinat
ionAccountNumber=&originatingAccountIdentifier=&destinationAccountIdentifier=&originatingAccount
Holder=&destinationAccountHolder=&search=Search&currentSortSettings
27
Please see:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/transaction.do?languageCode=en&startDate=18%2F01%2F2011&end
Date=31%2F01%2F2011&transactionStatus=4&fromCompletionDate=&toCompletionDate=&transactionI
D=&transactionType=-1&suppTransactionType=-1&originatingRegistry=-1&destinationRegistry=1&originatingAccountType=-1&destinationAccountType=1&originatingAccountNumber=&destinationAccountNumber=1936&originatingAccountIdentifier=&desti
nationAccountIdentifier=&originatingAccountHolder=&destinationAccountHolder=&search=Search&curr
entSortSettings
28
Preston Men Admit to Playing Part in £6m global credit scam, at note 25.
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DICE facilitates real-time VAT enforcement as well as real-time commercial
contract verification. It is a commercial invoice validation system that prevents tax
evasion, most notably MTIC fraud and the non-declared import of tradable services.29
DICE mimics the most effective administrative enforcement effort ever undertaken by
the US IRS – the requirement to disclose the social security numbers of dependents on
returns.30 Tax enforcement is simplified and streamlined when fraudsters know they are
(or they are convinced that they could be) being watched – in real-time detail. The fraud
stops on its own.31
DICE is an emerging compliance solution that has been adopted in part by some
jurisdictions, but has not been adopted in full (yet) by any jurisdiction. Leading
contenders in the race for full adoption include Rwanda and Croatia. The East African
Community (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) will most likely be the
first multi-jurisdictional adopter of DICE.
There are two elements to DICE – the digital invoice and the customs exchange.

29

The Australian Board of Taxation estimates that Australia looses an estimated $1 billion in GST from
imported services each year. Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE OF THE AUSTRALIAN RETAIL INDUSTRY xxxviii & 209 (November 4, 2011) No. 56,
available at: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/113761/retail-industry.pdf. “Tradable
services” is a term coined by the author and first use in the following paper: Richard Ainsworth, VAT
Fraud: The Tradable Services Problem, 61 TAX NOTES INT’L 217 (January 17, 2011).
30
Seven million dependents vanished from the tax rolls in 1986, and the IRS recovered three billion dollars
in revenue with a simple enforcement measure. Taxpayers were required to list the social security number
(SSN) for any dependent they claimed on their tax return. As the authors of Freakonomics explain, this
measure worked because taxpayers who had found it easy to cheat previously now feared that they could be
caught in real-time. Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics – a rogue economist explores
the hidden side of everything, 2006 (revised and expanded edition) at 238.
So why do people really pay their taxes: because it is the right thing to do, or because
they fear getting caught if they don’t? It sure seems to be the latter. A combination of
good technology (employer reporting and withholding) and poor logic (most people who
don’t cheat radically overestimate their chances of being audited) makes the system
work.
See: Margaret Milner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Remarks at the Direct Selling Association Tax
Seminar, (July 19, 1990) 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 141-60; Doc 95-7092 (discussing the Tax Compliance
Measurement Program and how these audits help the IRS determine areas where significant compliance
improvements can be made).
31
This is an active research field of human psychology, but it has a very real public policy impact. For
example, a cardboard cutout of a police officer inside the bicycle cage at a train station in Boston reduced
theft of bicycles by 67%. The idea behind the cutout was that if people “though” someone “might be”
looking they would think twice about theft. In this case it is really clear that the cop is a cardboard cutout,
but the impact was dramatic. Experiments involving subjects using a computer monitor that had graphic
with a pair of eyes looking out at the user also have had a measurable impact on honesty responses.
“Cardboard cop” prompts real drop in crime, BOSTON GLOBE (August 15, 2013) available at:
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/08/14/cardboard-cop-prompts-real-dropcrime/twoZrFoyg1qrPQCVLtnF8K/story.html; Martine Powers, The cardboard cutout cop – there’s
psychology there! BOSTON GLOBE (August 11, 2013) available at:
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/08/10/the-cardboard-cutout-cop-there-psychologythere/xYmonJYU95jxrMb78Xae4J/story.html.
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(1) Digital Invoice
To prepare the ground for an effective digital invoice regime a jurisdiction needs
to modify commercial law. Paper invoices should be replaced with digital invoices in
commercial practice. Brazil, for example, requires an invoice to be digital to be
enforceable. Paper invoices are acceptable only as replicas or evidence of the prior
digital invoice.
There are two models: the Chilean model that allows companies to voluntarily
adopt digital invoices;32 the Brazilian model that mandates digital invoices for companies
of a certain size.33 In Brazil the threshold has been progressively lowered to bring more
businesses into the digital invoice system. Once a firm has begun to use digital invoices
it cannot revert to paper. The Brazilian model is preferred for DICE.
There are six steps in the development of a digital invoice system. The following
discussion is based on a business-to-business (B2B) transaction within a single
jurisdiction. The steps are as follows:
STEP 1: The seller generates an electronic file in XML format34 that contains all
necessary contract and tax information for the sale of goods or services (a pro-forma
digital invoice).35 The issuer digitally signs the file (to assure integrity of the data and
32

Chile stated its electronic documents project in 2003 with a group of companies selected by the Internal
Tax Service (SII). The Chilean system began with invoices, credit and debit notes, and dispatch forms, as
well as purchase invoices. In 2005 the model was extended to export documents. In 2008 the boleta, or
receipt issued to final consumers was allowed to be digital. The Chilean government (since 2005) has
made available to small and medium sized firms a free application for the issuance of electronic documents.
The companies must only have a certificate from the SII, a digital signature, internet access, and SII
authorization as an electronic issuer. Chile has over 15,600 companies using facturas electrónicas, with
76% of this total representing micro and small companies. In 2009 the monthly total of tax documents
reached 406,315. Newton Oller de Mello, Eduardo Mário Dias, Caio Fernando Fontana, & Marcelo Luiz
Alves Fernandez, The Evolution of the Electronic Tax Documents in Latin America, Proceedings of the 8th
WSEAS International Conference on SYSTEM SCIENCE and SIMULATION in ENGINEERING (2009)
294, available at: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1938841.
33
In Brazil the digital invoice has been used for securing internal data for cross-border supplies among the
twenty-seven Brazilian states since 2006. It is part of the Brazilian tax modernization program called the
Sistema Publico de Escrituracao Digital or Public System for Digital Accounting (SPED). When it began
the NF-e pilot project. Progress was rapid. By April 2009 there were 25,000 NF-e issuers. The CT-e pilot
project began October 25, 2007. It involved two states (São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul) and 43
companies and transportation firms. By March 1, and April 1, 2009 respectively the firms in Rio Grande
do Sul and São Paulo began issuing legally binding CT-e documents. Large-scale adoption of the CT-e
began in 2010, and by the end of 2010 there were over 500,000 firms issuing digitally signed, cross-border
NF-e invoices. The system is fully in place today. Newton Oller de Mello, Eduardo Mario Dias, Caio
Fernando Fontana & Marcelo Alves Fernandez, The Implementation of the Electronic Tax Documents in
Brazil as a Tool to Fight Tax Evasion, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH WORLD SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING
ACADEMY AND SOCIETY (WSEAS) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS (2009) 449, 453, available
at: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1627575&picked=prox
34
XML is an acronym for eXtensible Markup Language. It is a set of rules for encoding documents in
machine-readable form. It is defined in the XML 1.0 Specification produced by the World-Wide Web
Consortium (W3C), and several other related specifications. These are gratis open standards.
35
It is important to note that these are not “heavy” files. For example, a large supermarket with gross
revenues of US$ 1 billion per year, and millions of invoices, would probably deliver a 5 megabyte file in a
month. [Example provided by Brazilian tax attorney Eric Kanno LLM (BU).]
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authorship).36 The file is then transmitted (through the Internet or other electronic
communications means) to the tax administration. The transmission constitutes a
“request for authorization” to use a digital invoice.37
STEP 2: The tax administration will act on the “authorization of use” request,
without which there can be no binding contract. Authorization is not difficult – it (a) is
fully automated (without human intervention), (b) is available 24/7, (c) requires only a
basic check of the XML file for accuracy and completeness, and (d) should take a few
seconds, and probably only a millisecond.
STEP 3: If the XML file is complete and accurate, the tax administration saves a
copy of the XML file and an electronic signature is produced. The electronic signature
serves as an access key, and is used for verification of complete invoice data by the
buyer, seller, the tax administration, or an approved third party. The access key is a
fixed-size alpha-numeric bit string. When reproduced on a paper invoice it may appear
as a bar code, which facilitates verification. In an audit context it will allow inspectors to
immediately call up (in real-time) any invoice in the commercial system with the press of
a button on a hand-held scanner.
STEP 4: The seller then composes and transmits a proposed invoice to the buyer.
It includes all of the data from the XML file along with the access key produced by the
tax administration.
STEP 5: The buyer will use the access key to check the validity of the invoice.
The buyer will then replicate the steps taken by the seller (above). In other words, the
XML file received from the seller will be digitally signed (this time by the buyer), and
the file will be transmitted to the tax administration (again) over the Internet. The tax
administration will re-verify, save the file, and produce a second access key that will be
returned to the buyer. The XML files from seller and buyer should match.
STEP 6: The buyer retains a copy of this file, and transmits it to the seller. A true
invoice is now issued containing all of the contract data and both access keys. Goods
will now be shipped, or services performed, and the VAT will become due in accordance
with the normal provisions of the VAT Act. Importantly, because the buyer will not be
allowed an input deduction without a valid invoice, it is this XML file (with two valid
access keys) that will support the deduction. A paper invoice will be sufficient, if it
contains the access keys because the access keys will allow the original digital invoice to
be located in the tax administration’s database.
Figure 2 sets out the essential steps of the digital invoice regime.
36

The digital certificate in Brazil is provided by Certsign at: http://www.certisign.com.br/ and Serasa at:
http://serasa.certificadodigital.com.br/
37
In Brazil this transmission is to the State Tax Administration for Impostos Sobre Circulação de
Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços (ICMS) verification. The ICMS is the state sales tax and the rate
varies depending upon the industry and the Sate. In a VAT/GST jurisdiction this transmission would be for
verifying the VAT/GST on a domestic transaction.
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There are two further permutations to the basic digital invoice scenario, one on
the buyer’s side the other on the seller’s side. On the buyer’s side the next sale could be
made to a final consumer; on the seller’s side there is the possibility that the seller may be
in another jurisdiction (an export/import transaction). The first permutation will not be
considered here. It is not part of a MTIC fact pattern.38
The important permutation for this discussion involves situations where the
supply crosses a national border. Fraud problems arise when a tradable service, or goods
are involved. Goods normally pass through customs, and when this occurs there are
some protections. Cross border goods transactions within a community are commonly
expedited, and when this occurs intra-community frauds occur.39 This is the case with
CO2 permits, which are treated as services in the EU until January 3, 2017.
38

For a discussion of this permutation see: Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Stopping VAT Fraud
with DICE – Digital Invoice Customs Exchange, 72 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 637 (November 18,
2013).
39
Algirdas Semeta, the European Commissioner for taxation indicated that the EU Commission is anxious
to cooperate. He observes:
There is no effective way of ensuring compliance if a business located in California, for
example, provides e-services to a private individual in Slovakia and does not register for
the e-commerce scheme and pay Slovak VAT what can the national tax authorities do
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The key to a digital invoice regime is the un-enforceability of the underlying
contract if the seller has not submitted the required XML file to the tax administration
and received back the necessary access key. There should be no difference between a
domestic and a foreign supplier in this regard. Both buyer and seller have an interest in
insuring enforceability. If compliance difficulties arise with foreign sellers it is expected
that intermediaries (like customs agents) would assist in processing XML files. Six steps
set out this fact pattern.
STEP 1: The seller will generate an electronic file in XML format containing all
necessary information as before. The issuer digitally signs the files (to assure integrity of
the data and authorship). The file is transmitted (through the Internet) to the destination
tax administration. The transmission constitutes a “request for authorization” to use a
digital invoice that will be acceptable to the destination jurisdiction.
STEP 2: The destination tax administration will act on the “authorization of use”
request, without which there can be no binding contract in the destination jurisdiction.
STEP 3: If the XML file is accurate, the destination tax administration will save
a copy of the XML file and an Internet access key (electronic signature) will be produced
as before.
STEP 4: The seller will compose and transmit an invoice to the buyer that will
include all of the data from the XML file along with the access key produced by the
destination tax administration.
STEP 5: The buyer will use the access key to check the validity of the invoice,
and replicate the steps taken by the seller (above).
STEP 6: The buyer will retain a copy of this file, and perform either a reverse
charge or pay the reverse VAT depending on the statute.
Figure 3 illustrates this situation.

realistically? The Commission is addressing this issue and has asked member states for a
mandate to negotiate with third countries on this issue from a collective position of
power. For the time being, though, compliance depends on the willingness of suppliers
in third countries to assume their legal obligations.
Algirdas Semeta, The mini-One Stop Shop for VAT – the start of something big! WORLD COMMERCE
REVIEW (June 2012) 28 (emphasis added).
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Because a foreign seller will not (normally) be collecting domestic VAT/GST the
digital invoice regime functions as an “early warning” system for the destination tax
administration. It alerts the authorities in advance of a reverse charge or reverse VAT
obligation of the buyer – a taxable transaction is occurring. Compliance should be
elevated. Buyers in the destination jurisdiction will know that their purchases are being
observed and recorded.
(2) Customs Exchange
Figure 3 presents a difficult scenario. The problem is: How does a jurisdiction
create an incentive structure that will induce foreign suppliers to comply with local tax
reporting rules? In Figure 3 the only incentive is that both buyer and seller want an
enforceable contract in the destination jurisdiction. A customs exchange presents a better
incentive paradigm.
With a customs exchange both jurisdictions have digital invoicing rules in place.
When sellers in one jurisdiction (origin) seek to export (good or services) to the other
jurisdiction (destination) the tax authorities will cooperate through the exchange to
perfect the cross-border digital invoice. There are eight steps involved.
STEP 1: The seller generates an electronic file in XML format containing all
necessary contract information as before. The seller digitally signs the files (to assure
integrity of the data and authorship). The file is transmitted (through the Internet) to the

14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2537545

Richard T. Ainsworth
Phishing, DICE & Power Exchanges
12/12/14

origin tax administration. The transmission constitutes a “request for authorization” to
use a digital invoice that will be acceptable to both origin and destination jurisdictions.
STEP 2: A check is performed of the XML file for accuracy and completeness.
STEP 3: If the XML file is accurate and complete then the origin jurisdiction
issues an “authorization of use” to the seller in the form of an access key (electronic
signature), and simultaneously notifies the destination jurisdiction with a copy of the
XML file and access key through the customs exchange. The access key will allow the
destination jurisdiction direct access to the data submitted in the XML file submitted by
the seller in the origin jurisdiction’s database.
STEP 4: The seller will now produce a pro-forma invoice that includes relevant
access codes.
STEP 5: The seller transmits the pro-forma invoice to the buyer. In most cases
this document will not mention VAT, because it will be the obligation of the buyer to
report VAT (in a reverse charge jurisdiction) or pay VAT (reverse VAT jurisdiction).
STEP 6: The buyer in the destination jurisdiction creates an XML file
reproducing all necessary contract information (as before). The buyer digitally signs the
files (to assure integrity of the data and authorship), and transmits the file (through the
Internet) to the destination tax administration. The transmission constitutes a “request
for authorization” to use a digital invoice that will be acceptable to both origin and
destination jurisdictions.
STEP 7: The destination tax administration will match the buyer’s XML file with
the seller’s XML file. If all of the data is complete and matches then it will issue a
second “authorization of use,” and issue a second access key (electronic signature) to the
buyer. The buyer will transmit the XML file and second access key to the seller. The
seller will be able to confirm the transaction through the destination tax administration’s
database. This documentation will be sufficient to support the seller’s zero-rated export
from the origin jurisdiction. In addition, the buyer is now on notice, and the destination
jurisdiction is aware, that he needs to perform a reverse charge or pay reverse VAT.
STEP 8: The seller will now process a zero-rated supply to the buyer from the
origin jurisdiction.
Figure 4 illustrates this situation.
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DICE APPLIED TO THE CZECH PHISHING ATTACK
If a digital invoice customs exchange was in operation in the EU at the time of the
Czech registry phishing attack there would likely be no theft of CO2 permits, but if there
had been anyway, then there would be no possibility that those CO2 permits could be
sold, or used as “assets” passing thorough a MTIC fraud chain.
In the real facts of the Czech phishing attack 500,000 certificates were taken from
the accounts of CEZ, a state-owned Czech utility company. They had been held in the
Czech Republic registry and were sold to 1124 Segel Sp. ZOO Holding, and then on to
the Liechtenstein account of Huntingdon Sp. ZOO. These were all cross border sales
(Czech Republic-to-Poland-to-Liechtenstein). Figure 3 applies.
Although the fraudsters controlled 1124 Segel Sp. ZOO Holding and Huntingdon
Sp. ZOO, and even though they could get access to the certificates in the Czech registry,
it would not be possible for them to produce an authentic digital signature from CEZ.
Without this signature, the first leg in the fraud chain would collapse. The Czech tax
administration would reject the invoice immediately (or within three seconds of the
attempted transfer at 09.32:06.115 on January 18, 2011). The Polish tax administration
would also be notified that a suspect transaction was being attempted (within the same
three second window).
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Subsequent transfers from Poland to Liechtenstein, and then to the UK would also
fail, because the whole string of invoice-signatures would not be verifiable. No tax
administration would approve these transactions. Ultimately, Shell Trading International
Ltd. (the real source of funds in this fraud) would never pay UK VAT on these CO2
permits if they were offered to them by SVS Ltd. STIL would know immediately that
their input deduction was invalid. The pro-forma VAT invoice would most likely be
rejected by their enterprise resource planning (ERP) system.
Under DICE the invoices that support the sale of goods or services are selfverifying. An invoice without valid signatures cannot be countersigned by the tax
administration and can never support a deduction. Fraud would not occur.
The underlying premise of the digital invoice customs exchange is that tax
compliance improves when taxpayers become aware that their activities are monitored in
real-time. There is very good evidence that this is the case in tax VAT/GST compliance,
and there is very good research in human psychology that explains why this is the case.40
DICE APPLIED TO ENERGY COMMODITIES
The reality of MTIC fraud is that it morphs and migrates. The current concern in
the EU is that MTIC is moving from CO2 permits into the energy sector. If there is a
lesson to be learned from CO2 MTIC it is that whenever a real-time transactional
database can be connected with a VAT built around self-authenticating invoices, MTIC
can be banished.
Through the EU-ETS we can trace CO2 fraud. But we are doing it in hindsight.
The EU-ETS is a real-time system, but there is no real-time analytics in place to deal with
the data as it is being generated. This is far from an impossible task, but in the present
CO2 market we simply do not have a fully robust system in place. In addition, the
decision has been made to remove CO2 permits from the list of taxable services as of
January 3, 2017 rather than perfecting the system.
Nevertheless, we have learned a lot. The phishing attack of January 18, 2011 on
the Czech registry has helped. The moral of this story is that what we have learned can
be directly applied to the commodity energy market. We know how that these markets
can be secured. There are three elements:

40

Tax administrations that are employing digital invoices and customs exchanges are tapping into a very
promising area of human psychology. This approach offers greater success than emphasizing punishment.
See: David G. Rand, Anna Dreber, Tore Wllingsen, Drew Fudenberg, & Martin A. Nowak, Positive
Interactions Promote Public Cooperation, 325 SCIENCE 1272 (September 4, 2009) (indicating that when
punishment and rewards are both present, rewards outperform punishment in repeated public goods games
and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by positive interactions with others).
The research also shows that the environment has a significant impact on psychological outcome, and the
tax authority needs to mold the commercial environment around its desired outcome and the needs of local
business. See: David G. Rand & Martin A. Nowak, Human cooperation, 17 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
SCIENCES 413 (August 2013).
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(a) an Independent Transaction Log (like that in the EU-ETS) needs to be
constructed with strong real-time analytics, and
(b) a secure self-verifying digital invoice is mandated for the energy commodity
market like that in the Brazilian Sistema Publico de Escrituracao Digital (SPED), and
(c) a system of automated invoice cross-checking is installed (the customs
exchange) as proposed in DICE.
Can this be done? Quite simply, “yes.”
Proven technology exists to implement DICE for real time CO2 sales in the EU.
Replicating this implementation in the commodity energy market is not a problem.
SmartCloud, an artificial intelligence (AI) company located in the US, uses the latest
semantic database technology to synchronize massive amounts of real-time transactions
across widely dispersed and disparate infrastructures. It is being deployed today for the
State Tax Administration in Ceará, Brazil (completion expected within the next few
months).
SmartCloud’s AI identifies suspicious transaction events for fraud detection and
noncompliance. In the US energy markets, for example, the company provides a unified
database and visualization of all US power transmission in real-time for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. This system has been operational for two years. It
integrates data every 6 seconds across 13 Independent System Operators using seven
incompatible energy management systems – an implementation that is fully analogous to
the EU topology. This is the system being deployed in Ceará and will soon be rolled out
in other South American locations for VAT fraud detection.
So, could SmartCloud do DICE? A call placed to Kim Mayyasi, SmartCloud’s
CEO presented this question. Not surprisingly, the response was: “… implementing a
real-time transaction database of all power sales in the EU with advanced reasoning for
back room analytics could implement the DICE proposal to eliminate MTIC from the EU
power markets, and it could do so for the EU CO2 market right now. This is a typical
challenge that our technology was designed to handle.”41

41

Personal communication (December 11, 2014) with Kim Mayyasi at kmayyasi@smartcloudinc.com.
Transcript of this communication is on file with the author.
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